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COMMENT
TAX PLANNING FOR COMPENSATION OF SERVICE
PARTNERS
In exchange for services rendered, promoters of a business ven-
ture may receive an interest in a partnership formed by contributors
of capital. Such promoters may be termed "service partners" in the
partnership formed and may receive a share of future profits or a
proprietary interest in the partnership.' Proprietary interests given
these service partners may be in the form of percentages of profit,
either outright or restricted, or in the form of inchoate interests
which become absolute once certain preconditions are satisfied.
None of these compensation techniques should be employed, how-
ever, without a thorough examination of tax consequences because
significant differences exist among them.
The basic provision of the Internal Revenue Code that governs the
tax ramifications of partnership formation is section 7212 which pro-
vides for nonrecognition of gain or loss when "property" is contrib-
uted to a partnership in exchange for a partnership interest.3 Al-
though analogous to section 351 which prescribes nonrecognition
treatment for transfers of "property," defined so as not to include
services, to controlled corporations,4 section 721 does not except
1. See Berger, Real Estate Syndication: Property, Promotion, and the Need for Protection,
69 YALE L.J. 725, 732 (1960).
2. Section 721 provides: "No gain or loss shall be recognized to a partnership or to any of
its partners in the case of a contribution of property to the partnership in exchange for an
interest in the partnership." INT. REv. CODE Or 1954, § 721.
3. Section 721 applies to both the formation of partnership and to contribution to partner-
ship capital in an ongoing partnership. See Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(a) (1956). See also A. WNILIS,
PARTNERSHIP TAXATION 79 (1971).
It is not entirely clear that section 721 was meant to deal with transfers of partial partner-
ship interests, such as a right to receive only future profits. The language of the section stating
that it applies where the transfer of property is for "an interest in the partnership" may mean
only a true partnership interest in capital and profits. See also INT. REV. CODE Or 1954, § 741
(providing for capital gains treatment on the sale of "an interest in a partnership"); cf.
Herman M. Hale, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 65,274 (1965) (denied capital gains treatment to sale
of an interest in future partnership profits). See notes 104-16 infra & accompanying text.
Nevertheless, section 721 and the regulations promulgated thereunder have been considered
applicable in profit-share situations, even if only to the extent that they do not purport to
prescribe rules for such an interest. See, e.g., Sol Diamond, P-H Tax Ct. Rep. 56.42, at
56-378 (1971); Cowan, Receipt of an Interest in Partnership Profits in Consideration for
Services: The Diamond Case, 27 TAx. L. REv. 161, 168-69 (1972).
4. Section 351(a) provides in part: "For purposes of this section, stock or securities issued
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expressly transfers of services for partnership interests from the non-
recognition rule.5 The regulations promulgated under section 721, 6
however, deny service partners these benefits and reflect the same
definition of "property" used in section 351(a). The Internal Rev-
enue Service (IRS) and courts interpreting these sections also have
opted for narrow interpretation of the word "property." 7 With non-
recognition of gain precluded for service partners, tax savings must
be effected by other means. Following a review of the judicial treat-
ment of section 721 property, this Comment will examine the tax
consequences flowing from an election to use other techniques.
SERVICES AS PROPERTY
The leading case concerning nonrecognition treatment for contri-
butions to partnership capital is Frazell v. United States,8 concern-
ing a geologist who had entered into an agreement with two other
individuals to purchase and develop oil and gas properties. Accord-
ing to the agreement the taxpayer was to use his skill and several
valuable oil maps that he owned to locate desirable properties which
could be purchased with money contributed by the other partners.
He was to receive in return a monthly salary, reimbursement for all
expenses, and a percentage interest in the partnership after profits
from operations enabled the two capital contributors to recoup their
expenses. His inchoate partnership interest was not assignable
until he became entitled to it under the terms of the agreement, and
any attempted disposal thereafter would be subject to a first option
in the two co-venturers. When a total recovery of expenses appeared
imminent, the venturers formed a corporation to acquire all the
joint venture's property, with the two capital contributors receiving
a major portion of the corporate stock plus debentures representing
unrecovered expenses, while the taxpayer-geologist received 13 per-
for services shall not be considered as issued in return for property." INr. REv. CODE oF 1954,
§ 351(a).
5. The nonrecognition provision of section 721 also has no requirement comparable to the
controlled corporation restriction in section 351(a). See id. § 368(c) ("control" means owner-
ship of at least 80 percent of corporation's voting and nonvoting stock).
6. Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1) (1956). See A. WnLls, supra note 3, at 79. For the text of
section 1.721-1(b)(1), see note 36 infra.
7. See notes 21-27 infra & accompanying text.




cent of the stock in exchange for his inchoate partnership share. He
sought to treat this receipt of stock as a tax-free exchange under
section 351 by claiming that the relinquishment of his inchoate
partnership interest constituted a transfer of property to the corpo-
ration in exchange for shares of its stock.9
The trial court accepted the taxpayer's arguments"0 primarily
because of a belief that the original venture should have been
treated as a partnership for tax purposes. Premising its decision
upon findings that the taxpayer had contributed his skill and efforts
to the venture for only "nominal compensation,"" that he had con-
tributed valuable oil maps to the venture, and that other incidents
of a true partnership, rather than an employer-employee relation-
ship, existed, 2 the court concluded that the taxpayer did possess
"property," an interest in partnership assets subject to the terms
of the original agreement, which could be transferred to the new
corporation in a tax-free exchange. 3
Finding that the trial court had given excessive attention to the
incidents of partnership under state law, the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit concluded that the partnership status of a joint
venture did not determine the tax consequences of receiving an
interest in such a venture and that the taxpayer's status as a joint
venturer did not preclude deeming the interest he received to be
ordinary income as compensation for services rendered. 4 The court
9. Id. at 460.
10. Id. at 461.
11. Id. at 467.
12. For example, Frazell was found to have had some degree of management authority and
some risk of loss in the venture. Id. at 467-68.
13. The trial court relied on several factors in its unarticulated holding that the taxpayer
had transferred "property" to the original joint venture. These factors were related to its
express holding that a true partnership existed despite language in the agreement strongly
evidencing an employment contract. The agreement that the taxpayer contribute his skill,
time, and labor, while the other co-venturers contributed capital, was a basis for finding a
true joint venture. Id. at 466. Additionally, his contribution of his geological maps was
deemed by both the trial court and the court of appeals also to be a true contribution of
property. See note 17 infra. The taxpayer also was considered by the trial court to be a bearer
of substantial risk of loss in the venture, 213 F. Supp. at 467, because if it failed to become
profitable he would never recoup his investment in time and effort. Considering the tax-
payer's salary "only nominal," the court apparently felt that the excess of the fair market
value for his services over this nominal salary also was contributed property. Finally, the
court found that the taxpayer also had some management authority, another indicium of true
partnership or joint venture status and that his interest in the venture existed despite the
fact that record title was maintained in the other co-venturers' names. Id. at 467-68.
14. 335 F.2d at 489. Section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code defines gross income as "all
1975] 1011
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:1009
of appeals noted that under either of two theories, the termination
of the original agreement and simultaneous formation of a corpora-
tion was a taxable event for the receipt of ordinary income by the
taxpayer. If the transaction was a termination of the original agree-
ment, the termination removed the preconditions to the taxpayer's
acquisition of a partnership interest and allowed that interest to
become possessory. '5 Alternatively, if the stock was issued in substi-
tution for the originally promised partnership interest, then the
transaction resulted in an issuance of stock as compensation for
services, a transaction taxable as ordinary income under section
351(a).16 Under either theory the fair market value of the stock
would be taxed as ordinary income.17
Frazell is significant for at least two reasons: first, reliance by the
court of appeals upon the regulations promulgated under section 721
to bolster the argument that ordinary income was realized by a
service partner when his interest became possessory"5 provided the
foundation for the subsequent uncertainty surrounding transfers of
various types of partnership interests;"9 second, the court of appeals'
reasoning implicity rejected the taxpayer's attempt to treat services
previously rendered as property that could be the subject of a tax-
free contribution.2 1
income from whatever source derived, including... [c]ompensation for services, including
fees, commissions and similar items. . . ." INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 61(a)(1).
15. 335 F.2d at 490. Under this theory the receipt of a partnership interest was taxable to
Frazell because it was compensation for services rendered. Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1) (1956).
Once received, this interest could be transferred to the new corporation in a nonrecognition
exchange under section 351(a).
16. 335 F.2d at 490.
17. Because it was apparent that Frazell's geological maps were valuable'and may have
been contributed by him to the venture, they were considered section 721 "property," and
he was allowed a credit for 'their value against the value of stock received. The case was re-
manded for factfinding on the questions of whether the maps actually were contributed and,
if so, what their value was at that time. Id. at 491. See Frazell v. United States, 269 F. Supp.
885 (W.D. La. 1965) (on remand).
18. 335 F.2d at 490.
19. See notes 37-46 infra & accompanying text.
20. Whether the taxpayer in Frazell contended that the partnership interest, which he
claimed was transferred to the corporation, had become his by any means other than as
compensation for services rendered is unclear. The Commissioner argued that the original
agreement was merely a contract of employment. 213 F. Supp. at 458. This argument was
based on the realities of the transaction, which had most of the indicia of a partnership
including title to the partnership's assets and management control in the capital-contributing
partners. Additionally, the original agreement used language of employment when referring
to Frazell. Id. at 463. See also Diamond v. Commissioner, 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9306, at 83,651
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Perhaps the clearest indication that services performed by a pro-
moter will not be treated as "property" treated as a nonrecognizable
contribution comes from the Tax Court's decision in William A.
James.2' Although James involved section 351, rather than sec-
tion 721, its rationale seems equally applicable to partnership
organization. 2 The taxpayer in James was a real estate developer
(7th Cir. 1974); Cowan, supra note 3, at 202-07 (discussion of partnership attributes).
Although the district court apparently believed this argument strong enough to merit
specific consideration and rejection, 213 F. Supp. at 463, the court of appeals did not dwell
on the taxpayer's status as an employee because of its finding that he had received taxable
income as a service partner. 335 F.2d at 489-90. Adoption of the trial court's rationale would
have allowed a taxpayer to escape entirely any taxation on the receipt of a partnership
interest, a result wholly inconsistent with the principle that ordinary income is realized
when compensation, in any form, is received for services. See INT. REv. COD OF 1954, § 61(a)
(1); note 14 supra.
Because the taxpayer was found to have acquired some interest in the venture by the time
the original agreement was terminated and had paid no tax on the receipt of that interest, it
follows that the trial court felt that the interest was received in a tax-free exchange under
section 721. The taxpayer might have argued that the interest he owned at the later date had
been transferred to him when the original agreement was executed, at a time when it had no
value and therefore did not create any taxable income. Cf. Sol Diamond, P-H Tax Ct. Rep.
$ 56.42, at 56-378 to -79 (1971); Vestal v. United States,'74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9407 (8th Cir.
1974); Cowan, supra note 3, at 192, 212.
Under proper analysis, however, the nature of the interest received by Frazell precludes
that treatment. A true conveyance of property, if valueless when transferred, would give the
taxpayer property that could be disposed of later as a capital asset transaction, or as at-
tempted in Frazell, in a nonrecognition transfer under section 351(a), with no tax liability.
See notes 37-43 infra & accompanying text. The interest given to Frazell, however, was not
an absolute conveyance of property, but rather a promise to convey property at a later date
upon the fulfillment of stated conditions. Therefore, the original agreement gave Frazell only
a contract right to receive property later and not the property interest in a joint venture that
he later claimed he could exchange for corporate stock. See also Cowan, Receipt of a Partner-
ship Interest for Services, 32 N.Y.U. INsT. ON FED. TAx. 1501, 1515-17 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Partnership Interest].
The court of appeals, by reasoning that the taxpayer had not received an interest in the
partnership until the original agreement was terminated, in effect held that he had not yet
received any compensation for services rendered. The trial court, however, apparently felt
that a partnership interest already had been received. Because such an interest could not
have been received in a nontaxable transaction unless the taxpayer had transferred "prop-
erty" to the venture, the trial court must have believed that his services constituted the
necessary property interest. A fundamental implication of the court of appeals' holding is that
no such tax-free exchange had taken place. Therefore, the ultimate reversal of the trial court's
decision in Frazell is not startling; the reversal is consistent with the realities of the situation,
and it rejects the implicit argument that the taxpayer's services in some way constituted
"property" under section 721.
21. P-H Tax Ct. Rep. % 53.10 (1969).
22. In fact, the Tax Court in James cited the hybrid partnership-corporation Frazell case
as one with "substantially similar" facts. Id. at 53-49.
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and builder who, in return for promoting an apartment house
project,s was to receive a 50 percent interest in the corporation
formed to own the project. The minutes of a board of directors
meeting stated that the taxpayer received his stock in exchange for
various items, most notably mortgage loan commitments from a
lender and the Federal Housing Administration, which were termed
"property." 24 Finding that the promoter's services had not resulted
in the development of a property interest, the Tax Court rejected
the attempt to fit the transaction within section 351 .21 Holding that
local law did not determine what constituted section 351 property, 26
the court declined to treat services as "property."21
23. The taxpayer had responsibility for securing necessary planning, architectural, and
legal services, for supervising construction, and for obtaining financing for the project. Id.
24. Id. at 53-47.
25. Id. at 53-49.
26. Td.
27. The Tax Court deemed the taxpayer's services distinguishable from patents and secret
processes. Id. Moreover, because the mortgage loan commitments were commitments to the
corporation that was to be organized to own the property when construction was completed,
the court noted that they were never property belonging to the taxpayer; the FHA commit-
ment, in fact, could not have been made to an individual under FHA regulations. Id. Accord,
Boles v. United States, 72-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9493 (S.D. Ohio 1972) (stock in corporation that
had been organized by taxpayer and others to acquire a business held to have been issued
for services and not for property under section 351); Elihu B. Washburne, P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
68,122 (1968).
The taxpayer in Washburne, president and general manager of an accounts receivable
factoring business, had been given permission by the owner to find a purchaser for the
business who would he satisfactory to the taxpayer. After one unsuccessful attempt, a satis-
factory buyer was found and the sale was consummated after extended negotiations. The
taxpayer remained as manager of the business and received 10 percent of the stock of a
corporation that had been formed to purchase the business. By characterizing the authoriza-
tion received to find a purchaser for the business as an "option," the taxpayer attempted to
structure the issuance of stock as a section 351 exchange. The Tax Court, however, rejected
this claim by finding that the taxpayer was merely an agent of the former owner because the
details of the transaction had not been worked out when the authority to locate a buyer was
extended although in a true option such details would have been a part of the original
agreement. Id. at 68-656. The court deemed a letter formalizing the former owner's offer to
the taxpayer in terms of an option as a mere attempt to restructure the transaction to
maximize the taxpayer's tax benefits after the sale had been finalized. Id. The issuance of
stock was found to be compensation for taxpayer's services rendered, and to be rendered, to
the new corporation, either because he had brought the opportunity to the attention of the
new owners or in return for his agreement to continue to manage the business. Id. Cf. Sol
Diamond, P-H Tax Ct. Rep. 56.42, at 56-377 (1972), a/i'd, Diamond v. Commissioner, 74-1
U.S. Tax Cas. 9306 (7th Cir. 1974). But see Sidney J. Ungar, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 63,159
(1963) (held to be transfer of property and not compensation for services under section 351
where taxpayer transferred to a corporation a valuable contract right to purchase, under
favorable terms, an offce building).
SERVICE PARTNER COMPENSATION
Frazell and James taken together create great difficulty for a
service partner seeking to receive a partnership interest in a nonrec-
ognition exchange within the ambit of section 721.2 To the extent
that the service partner also contributes money or other real or
personal property to the venture, nonrecognition treatment would
be available. 2 For example, if the service partner owned an option
or contract to purchase real estate, this right also could be trans-
ferred to the partnership within section 721,11 but such an option or
contract right clearly must have been obtained by the partner in an
independent transaction.3' Moreover, the courts will analyze care-
fully the motive underlying any transaction to determine whether
in fact an option or contract right exists.32 Consequently, a pro-
moter's efforts in obtaining property for a joint venture may reduce
the likelihood that the contribution of that property would be pro-
tected by section 721.11
Since the tax benefits of a section 721 transfer cannot be obtained
for a mere service partner, attempts to minimize the federal income
tax burden may be made in other ways. Immediate adverse tax
effects might be avoided by spreading income over a period of years
to avoid jumping the service partner into a higher bracket or by
postponing recognition of income to future years when the service
partner's income from other sources is reduced. Conversely, the tax-
payer also might desire to realize his compensation income immedi-
ately whenever the value of property received as compensation will
appreciate so as to create a greater subsequent tax liability. Proper
tax planning also may enable the service partner to postpone the
bulk of his tax liability until he disposes of the property received as
compensation, at which time he can treat the amount realized as a
capital gain. Attempts to arrange service-partner compensation to
maximize these tax planning benefits may take one of two forms:
rather than receiving an outright partnership interest, the service
partner might receive either a restricted capital interest or an
28. Similarly, nonrecognition treatment would be precluded under section 351.
29. Frazell v. United States, 335 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 961 (1965).
If a corporate organization were involved, the 80-percent-control test of section 351(a) also
would have to be satisfied. See note 5 supra.
30. Sidney J. Ungar, P-H Tax Ct. Meri. 63,159 (1963).
31. William A. James, P-H Tax Ct. Rep. 1 53.10 (1969).
32. Compare Elihu B. Washburne, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 68,120 (1968), with Sidney J.
Ungar, P-H Tax Ct. Mere. 63,159 (1963).
33. See generally Berger, supra note 1.
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interest only in future profits of the partnership."
CAPITAL INTERESTS
Inasmuch as the FrazeUi opinion provides a leading case concern-
ing use of capital interests to compensate service partners and a
specific statute, section 83(a) of the Internal Revenue Code,35 pre-
scribes the treatment of capital interests, planning may be under-
taken in this area with a high degree of certainty. The regulations
promulgated under section 72136 also address transfers of capital
interests in a partnership to a service partner as compensation for
services rendered.
A grant of this type of interest was attempted in Frazell,
31 al-
34. Arguably, section 721, rather than encompassing exchanges involving partial or
restricted interests, only pertains to the exchange 6f property for an outright partnership in-
terest. See note 3 supra. Because the regulations promulgated under section 721, however,
speak of an "interest in capital," Trees. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1) (1956), they seemingly were
intended to cover any capital interest in a partnership, whether restricted or unrestricted.
Moreover, the regulations speak of "substantial restrictions or conditions" that may affect
the time of realization of a capital interest. These regulations also have influenced judicial
decisions concerning profit shares, and section 721 therefore is the primary statutory focal
point for all forms of service partner compensation. See also Branscomb, Taxation of the
Service Partner for an Interest in Partnership Profits or Capital, 22D ANN. TUL. TAX. INST.
90, 95-100 (1973).
35. INT. Rev. CODE OF 1954, § 83(a). For the text of section 83(a), see note 52 infra. Pro-
posed Trees. Reg. § 1.721-1(b) (1), 36 Fed. Reg. 10,799 (1971), makes section 83 applicable to
restricted capital transfers under section 721. Even before enactment of section 83 in 1969,
the transfer of a capital interest would have resulted in rather certain tax consequences. See
A. WILls, supra note 3, §§ 8.02-.03, 9.02-.03.
36. The regulations provide:
Normally, under local law, each partner is entitled to be repaid his contribu-
tion of money or other property to the partnership (at the value placed upon
such property by the partnership at the time of the contribution) whether made
at the formation of the partnership or subsequent thereto. To the extent that
any of the partners gives up any part of his right to be repaid his contributions
(as distinguished from a share in partnership profits) in favor of another partner
as compensation for services (or in satisfaction of an obligation), section 721 does
not apply. The value of an interest in such partnership capital so transferred to
a partner as compensation for services constitutes income to the partner under
section 61. The amount of such income is the fair market value of the interest
in capital so transferred, either at the time the transfer is made for past services,
or at the time the services have been rendered where the transfer is conditioned
on the completion of the transferee's future services. The time when such income
is realized depends on all the facts and circumstances, including any substantial
restrictions or conditions on the compensated partner's right to withdraw or
otherwise dispose of such interest.
Tress. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1) (1956).
37. See notes 8-17 supra & accompanying text. The trial court stated in Frazell that the
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though the attempt was ill conceived.38 In particular, it is apparent
that the transfer was not a present transfer of a property interests
at the time the agreement was executed, but a promise to make a
future transfer of property once certain conditions were fulfilled.0
Because the transfer of property thus was postponed, the taxpayer
could not claim that he had received a property interest at the
inception of the arrangement since that interest was of negligible
value. Instead the termination of the agreement and subsequent
formation of a corporation which issued stock to the taxpayer effec-
tively conferred the promised property upon him, generating tax-
able compensation income at that time.41 An obvious tax planning
guide to be derived from Frazell is that, whenever the property
to be transferred as compensation will appreciate in value, the
transfer should be made as quickly as possible to minimize the tax
burden of receiving ordinary income. Early realization can be ac-
complished by drafting the partnership agreement 2 to effect an
immediate transfer of capital to the service partner.43
If a present transfer of capital is undesirable for nontax reasons,
taxpayer was to receive an interest in the total profits of the venture, clearly an interest in
partnership property. 213 F. Supp. at 459. In fact, when denying a petition for rehearing, the
court of appeals specifically rejected an attempt to characterize the transfer as a profit share
rather than a capital interest to show the inapplicability of section 721. United States v.
Frazell, 339 F.2d 885, 886 (5th Cir. 1964) (per curiam). See A. AEONSOHN, PARTNERSHIPS AND
INCOME TAX 60-61 (1970).
38. See A. Wmus, supra note 3, at 72-73; Partnership Interest, supra note 20, at 1516-17.
39. A. WiLis, supra note 3, at 70. Assuming the interest was valueless at the time, such
an outright transfer would have given the taxpayer no recognizable ordinary income; a gain
on subsequent sale of the interest would have generated capital gains income equal to the
amount realized, because the basis would be zero.
40. See A. WrLus, supra note 3, at § 8.05. The transfer was conditioned upon priorrecovery
of all costs incurred by the other partners. See note 9 supra & accompanying text.
41. See A. W.us, supra note 3, at 73. The tax consequences were the same under either
of the appellate court's two alternative holdings in Frazell. See notes 15-17 supra.
42. See A. WMm, supra note 3, §§ 8.05, 8.07, 9.06, 9.12; cf. Cowan, supra note 3, at 192,
212 (suggests earlier transfer of profit share to minimize tax burden). Care must be taken
when drafting the document to distinguish between a present transfer of property and a
promise to transfer property in the future. See A. WrLais, supra note 3, at 72. See also
Partnership Interest, supra note 20, at 1530-31; Branscomb, supra note 34, at 103-09.
43. If, as in Frazell, the other partners desire to recover their costs before the service
partner is to receive the benefits of his interest, a present transfer still can be arranged to
minimize the service partner's tax burden. By contributing a minimal amount of money
initially, and by loaning the rest of the necessary money to the venture, to be repaid out of
the partnership profits, the capital contributors could transfer an outright interest to the
service partner immediately. See A. WiLms, supra note 3, at 94-95.
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as was the situation in FrazelI," the service partner may be compen-
sated by the transfer of a present interest subject to substantial
restrictions.45 This type of compensation is distinguishable from the
promise of a future transfer in Frazell because the restricted transfer
involves a present transfer of partnership capital.4" Unlike an uncon-
ditional present transfer,4 7 however, its use and enjoyment is limited
by restrictions that may affect the value of the interest conveyed.
Treasury regulations section 1.721-1(b)(1) clearly contemplates
such transfers,48 the amount of income being the fair market value
of the interest conveyed 9 and the time of realization depending
upon "all the facts and circumstances, including any substantial
restrictions or conditions on the compensated partner's right to
withdraw or otherwise dispose of such interest.""9 Great flexibility
was accorded such transfers before July 1, 1969, because the tax-
payer recipients were permitted to elect, under most circumstances
after the restrictions had been removed, to be taxed upon the lesser
of the value of the property when transferred or its value at the time
the restrictions were removed." The taxpayer thus not only could
postpone compensation, he also benefited from the advantage of
hindsight when determining his tax liability.
Service partners receiving restricted property as remuneration
after June 30, 1969, have lost the benefit of hindsight, however,
because section 8352 of the Code now prescribes specific rules. 3 Al-
44. For example, the capital contributors might want to recover their costs before the
service partner can enjoy the interest given to him, or they might want to condition such
enjoyment on the successful management of the venture for a period of time.
45. See A. Wmus, supra note 3, §§ 8.03-.04, 9.03.
46. A transfer of a partnership interest subject to restriction is treated similarly to a
transfer of any property subject to restrictions as compensation for services. See id. § 9.03.
47. See notes 42-43 supra & accompanying text.
48. "The time when such income is realized depends on all the facts and circumstances,
including any substantial restrictions or conditions on the compensated partner's right to
withdraw or otherwise dispose of such interest." Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1) (1956). See A.
WLIS, supra note 3, § 9.03.
49. Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1) (1956). The measurement of fair market value generally is
at the time of transfer if the transfer is for past services, or when the services have been
rendered if the transfer is conditioned upon completion of future services. Id.
50. Tress. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1) (1956).
51. See A. Wiuas, supra note 3, §§ 8.03, 9.03. The tax consequences of such a transfer
therefore could be tailored to provide the same benefits as an outright immediate transfer.
See id. § 8.03, at 71.
52. Section 83 was added to the Code by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172,
83 Stat. 588, and provides, in part:
(a) General Rule.-If, in connection with the performance of services, prop-
[Vol. 16:10091018
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though under section 83 receipt of restricted property need not gen-
erate ordinary income for the service partner until the restrictions
expire,5' the income realized from post-1969 transfers must be
arty is transferred to any person other than the person for whom sucb-services
are performed, the excess of-
(1) the fair market value of such property (determined without re-
gard to any restriction other than a restriction which by its terms will
never lapse) at the first time the rights of the person having the beneficial
interest in such property are transferable or are not subject to a substan-
tial risk of forfeiture, whichever occurs earlier, over
(2) the amount (if any) paid for such property, shall be included in
the gross income of the person who performed such services in the first
taxable year in which the rights of the person having the beneficial inter-
est in such property are transferable or are not subject to a substantial
risk of forfeiture, whichever is applicable. The preceding sentence shall
not apply if such person sells or otherwise disposes of such property in
an arm's length transaction before his rights in such property become
transferable or not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture.
(b) Election To Include in Gross Income in Year of Transfer.-
-(1) In general:-Any person who performs services in connection
with which property is transferred to any person may elect to include in
his gross income, for the taxable year in which such property is trans-
ferred, the excess of-
(A) the fair market value of such property at the time of trans-
fer (determined without regard to any restriction other than a re-
striction which by its terms will never lapse), over
(B) the amount (if any) paid for such property. If such election
is made, subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to the transfer
of such property, and if such property is subsequently forfeited, no
deduction shall be allowed in respect of such forfeiture.
(c) Special Rules.&-For purposes of this section-
(1) Substantial risk of forfeiture.-The rights of a person in property
are subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture if such person's rights to full
enjoyment of such property are conditioned upon the future performance
of substantial services by any individual.
(2) Transferability of property.-The rights of a person in property
are transferable only if the rights in such property of any transferee are
not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture.
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 83.
53. Section 83 does not provide expressly that it applies to transfers ofpartnership interests
to service partners, but there is little doubt that such transactions were intended to be within
its scope. A proposed regulation, Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1), 36 Fed. Reg. 10,799
(1971), explicitly makes section 83 applicable to restricted transfers of partnership capital.
The restrictions mentioned in section 83 concern property that is not transferable or is
subject to substantial risk of forfeiture. Ier. Rrv. CODE OF 1954, § 83(a)(1). These restrictions,
defined in section 83(c), seemingly would include the types of restrictions typically imposed
in the transfer of a partnership interest to a service partner. See note 52 supra.
54. INr. Rav. CODE of 1954, § 83(a). See A. Wkus, supra note 3, § 8.04.
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measured by the fair market value of the property when the restric-
tions expire.5 Nonetheless, some leeway still is permitted by section
83(b), which allows the taxpayer to elect to include the property in
his gross income in the year of transfer." Under this election, which
must be made within 30 days of the transfer,57 the property's value
is its fair market value determined without regard to any restric-
tions that eventually will lapse.5
A service partner anticipating a significant increase in the value
of his partnership interest during the life of the restrictions therefore
should make an immediate section 83(b) election to recognize ordi-
nary income based on the interest's relatively low value at that
time. This immediate recognition of ordinary income, combined
with capital gains treatment of: the increase in value upon a subse-
quent sale of the interest after the restrictions have expired, would
result in a lower total tax than would postponement of recognition
until the restrictions lapse when the entire value of the property
would be treated as ordinary income. If the service partner forsees
little appreciation in value, he should not elect to be taxed immedi-
ately because total declared income then would be the same regard-
less of when recognized and because the service partner could avail
himself of the deferral provision of section 83(a).11
Choosing among unrestricted present transfers of partnership
capital, restricted transfers of partnership capital, and promises to
transfer partnership capital in the future with a desire to minimize
income tax liability requires the service partner to forecast into the
future." An unrestricted transfer, although frequently desirable for
its tax advantages, may prove impractical from a business stand-
55. INT. REV. ConE oF 1954, § 83(a)(2). The consideration paid by the transferee, if any, is
subtracted from the value of the property transferred to calculate the taxable income. Id. §
83(a).
56. Id. § 83(b)(1).
57. Id. § 83(b)(2). Such election is irrevocable without the consent of the Secretary or his
delegate. Id.
58. Id. § 83Cb)(1)(A).
59. Similarly, taxation should be deferred if the value of the restricted interest was ex-
pected to depreciate before the restrictions were removed. Deferred recognition also would
be preferable where the restriction imposes a substantial risk of forfeiture, rather than a
limitation on transferability, if the tax benefits of present recognition are not significant; such
a taxpayer who makes a section 83(b) election may foreclose a deduction if the potential
forfeiture actually should occur, id. § 83(b)(1)(B), the election of present taxation resulting
in a tax on the value of compensation that the taxpayer never was able to enjoy.
60. For an excellent comparison of these three alternatives, see A. WiLUS, supra note 3, §
8.07. See also Partnership Interest, supra note 20, at 1530-36.
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point. A restricted transfer, more in line with nontax realities when
one member of a partnership is to contribute only services,"' often
requires at the time of transfer a speculative judgment that can
have troubling tax consequences. Finally, a promise to convey an
interest in the future, although avoiding present recognition of in-
come, can result in realization of a substantial amount of ordinary
income at a later time when the interest actually is conveyed.',
Because the consequences of electing any one of these alternatives
depend upon business fortuities, other methods have been sought
for compensating a service partner in a manner that will minimize
his federal income tax burden. The transfer of an interest solely in
the future profits of the venture evolved as one popular method 3 to
defer realization of income while removing to some degree the judg-
mental risks involved in the transfer of partnership capital.
PROFIT SHARES
Prior to 1972 compensation by means of a profits-only interest in
a partnership provided rather predictable tax consequences" to a
service partner, particularly where the future profitability of the
venture could be foretold accurately. Virtually all authorities agreed
that the transfer of an interest in future profits to compensate a
service partner did not create any present taxable income."5 Largely
as a consequence of the language of section 1.721-1(b)(1) of the
regulations6 and the difficulties inherent in any alternative treat-
ment, 7 it was assumed that a service bartner receiving a profit share
61. For example, the capital-contributing partners undoubtedly would want to restrict the
service partner's right to dissolve the partnership and claim his proportionate share of part-
nership capital. Thus, conditions might be placed upon the service partner's right to a share
of that capital, and the transfer no longer would be unrestricted. See A. Wxms, supra note
3, § 9.03.
62. See id. § 8.07. Willis c6ncludes that the restricted transfer usually is preferable. Id. at
76, 84.
63. See Cowan, supra note 3.
64. The consequences of a profit-share transfer were subject to an accepted interpretation
of the treasury regulations that was a "consensus ... shared by the entire tax bar." Id. at
183. See also Partnership Interest, supra note 20, at 1522-23.
65. See, e.g., Herman M. Hale, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 65,274, at 65-1646 n.3 (1965); A.
AnoNsoHN, supra note 37, at 57-58; Cowan, supra note 3, at 161.
66. See note 36 supra. See also Cowan, supra note 3, at 168-69.
67. Willis has noted:
However obliquely the proposition is stated in the regulations, it is clear that
a partner who receives only an interest in future profits of the partnership as a
compensation for services is not required to report the receipt of his partnership
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would be taxed only on his distributive portion when the partner-
ship realized income. This approach prevented the double taxation
that would have occurred if the service partner had been taxed upon
receipt of the interest and again on his subsequent share of distrib-
uted income. The only alternative for avoiding double taxation
would have been to allow the service partner to offset against subse-
quent partnership income the value of the profit interest upon which
taxes had been paid." This latter alternative would have been diffi-
cult for the IRS to administer:. 9
A fear that deferred taxation would enable service partners to sell
for a lump sum their rights to receive future profits and treat gain
on that sale as capital gain led the Tax Court to hold in 1972 that
the receipt of a profit share as compensation for services was a
taxable event in some circumstances.71 This decision, affirmed by
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Diamond v.
Commissioner,71 sharply reversed rather well settled tax doctrine.
The resultant uncertainty undoubtedly will curtail the use of profit
shares to compensate service partners.
The facts in Diamond illustrate not only the fears that led to the
court's holding, the result of which admittedly is sound, but also an
alternative rationale under assignment of future income principles
that would not discourage the use of this compensation technique.
The taxpayer in Diamond was a builder and mortgage broker who
agreed to obtain financing for the acquisition of an office building
by a partnership in return for a 60-percent interest in the venture's
interest as taxable income. The rationale is twofold. In the first place, the
present value of a right to participate in future profits is usually too conjectural
to be subject to valuation. In the second place, the service partner is taxable on
his distributive share of partnership income as it is realized by the partnership.
If he were taxed on the present value of the right to receive his share of future
partnership income, either he would be taxed twice, or the value of his right to
participate in partnership income must be amortized over some period of time.
A. WiLLs, supra note 3, at 84.85. See also A. ARONSOHN, supra note 37, at 57-58. These
difficulties were recognized by the court of appeals in the case that nevertheless ended the
previous unanimity of interpretation. Diamond v. Commissioner, 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9306,
at 83,654 (7th Cir. 1974). See note 71 infra & accompanying text.
68. See A. WiLLIs, supra note 3, at 85.
69. This unmanageability was exacerbated by the absence of any established method by
which such interest could be amortized. See Diamond v. Commissioner, 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
T 9306, at 83,654 (7th Cir. 1974). See note 102 infra & accompanying text.
70. See Sol Diamond, P-H Tax Ct. Rep. 56.42 (1971).
71. 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9306 (7th Cir. 1974).
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future profits. 72 Within three weeks after the original purchase the
taxpayer indirectly sold his profit share to a third party for $40,000.73
Instead of reporting this sum as gross income for that year, the
taxpayer claimed a short-term capital gain of $40,000 from the sale
of a partnership interest.74 That the amount received was compensa-
tion for services apparently was undisputed, and no attempt was
made to characterize the original transaction as a tax-free exchange
under section 721.15 Instead, the taxpayer relied upon the then pre-
vailing interpretation of regulations 'section 1.721-1(b)(1) that no
taxable event occurred upon the transfer of a profits-only, as distin-
guished from a capital, partnership interest.76 Rejecting this argu-
ment and finding that the taxpayer's interest had a value at the
date of transfer because of its high sales price less than three weeks
later,77 the Tax Court determined that section 721 did not protect
the transfer.78
72. P-H Tax Ct. Rep. 56.42, at 56-372. The taxpayer was to receive the agreed percentage
from profits generated by the operation of the building and bear a proportionate share of any
losses. He also would receive the same percentage of the gain realized on a subsequent sale
of the property, but only after the other partner had been reimbursed for expenses incurred
in the original acquisition.
'73. The taxpayer sold his 60-percent interest back to the other partner, who then sold a
50-percent interest to the third party purchaser.
74. Id.
75. In fact, the original agreement stated that the interest conveyed was "compensation
...for the services to be rendered" by the taxpayer. P-H Tax Ct. Rep. 56.42, at 56-372.
76. Id. at 56-378.
77. Id.
78. Id. The Tax Court apparently misconstrued the taxpayer's argument when it held that
section 721 did not apply to prevent the'realization of gain upon the initial transfer. The court
stated: "Certainly, unless section 721 of the Code grants the relief which petitioners seek, they
are left subject to section 61." Id. See note 14 supra. The taxpayer, however, probably had
not claimed that section 721 protected him; rather, he undoubtedly based his argument on
the regulations promulgated thereunder, which had formed the foundation for the prior
consensus that Code section 721 and section 1.721-1(b)(1) of the regulations did not purport
to deal with profit shares but only controlled the tax treatment of transfers of an interest in
partnership capital. Cf. Cowan, supra note 3, at 190. The Tax Court neglected to refute or
even mention the prior interpretation of section 1.721-1(b)(1), and therefore seemingly missed
the point of the taxpayer's contention. Of course, even the previously accepted understanding
of the taxation of a profit share would not support the taxpayer's attempt to treat the proceeds
of a sale of his profit share as capital gains income; it only would prevent the taxation of the
value of such an interest when initially received.
Subjecting the $40,000 to taxation as ordinary income seems proper on the facts present in
Diamond since the tax law disfavors ever attempt to transform ordinary income into capital
gains. See authorities cited at P-H Tax Ct. Rep. 156.42, at 56-379 n.16. By preventing this
conversion, however, the Tax Court arguably used an unnecessary path which reversed au-
thoritative interpretations of an admittedly obscure regulation to reach an objective with
apparently minimal revenue effects. See Cowan, supra note 3, at 211. Because compensation
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The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concluded, as did
the Tax Court, that no provision in the Code or regulations expressly
prescribed the tax treatment for receipt of a profit share in a part-
nership." After noting that affirmation of the Tax Court decision
would break with past interpretations,80 the court also acknowl-
edged that the Tax Court's holding would necessitate a valuation
of the profit share transferred and a determination of whether a
transfer is within the scope of the ruling.81 Following the ruling also
would raise the possibility of double taxation because of the lack of
a recognized setoff procedure. 8 Although the court limited the ex-
pansive Tax Court holding by providing for immediate taxation
only when the market value of a profit share is readily determina-
ble,83 a situation apparently believed to be exceptional, it affirmed,
deferring to the expertise of the Commissioner and the Tax Court.84
This deference to expertise, however, appears unwarranted in
Diamond; by affirming, the court compounded the uncertainties of
a radical departure from existing law by accepting opinions which
failed to refute the arguments supporting the previous consensus.
Moreover, in its desire to prevent the revenue drain that would
result if the taxpayer were able to obtain capital gains treatment of
his partnership share, the court approved an approach which cre-
ates more problems than it solves.8
Problems inherent in the Diamond approach surfaced in Vestal
v. United States,86 a case in litigation while Diamond was pending
to the service partner is deductible by a partnership, partnerships previously had allocated
part or all of that deduction to the service partner to offset some or all of his taxable income
from the compensation for services. See Partnership Interest, supra note 20, at 1533-34;
Branscomb, supra note 34, at 109-10.
79. 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. % 9306, at 83,652.
80. Id. The court of appeals recognized that the taxpayer's contention, that the profit share
was not taxable upon receipt, was supported by commentators, Tax Court dictum, legislative
history, and administrative interpretation. Id. at 83,652-53.
81. Id. at 83,652-53.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 83,653.
85. One commentator has suggested that extension of Diamond "to its logical limits"
would make taxable such events as the elevation of a law firm associate to partner status or
the increase of a partner's percentage share of future profits. Partnership Interest, supra note
20, at 1526. Accord, Branscomb, supra note 34, at 102. This unexpected effect could be
negated, however, by allocating the partner some or all of the partnership deduction. See note
78 supra.




on appeal. As compensation for bringing the investment to their
attention, investors in certain Canadian oil and gas fields agreed
individually to give the geologist-taxpayer in Vestal a right to re-
ceive, after recovery of all costs, an interest in the pbrinership
formed to develop the fields. The partnership sold its oil and gas
properties before any interest was conveyed to the taxpayer, and
after deducting their expenses from the sale proceeds, each investor
paid the promised fractional share out of the residual balance. In
response to the taxpayer's attempt to report these payments as long-
term capital gains in the year they were paid, the Government
argued that since he had received nothing of ascertainable value
when the original contracts were executed, the sale of the interests
in a later year resulted in a realization of ordinary income as com-
pensation for prior services. 7
Accepting the taxpayer's claim that the interest had a determina-
ble value when received, the trial court found that it constituted
ordinary income to the taxpayer at that time. 8 Additionally, the
court implicitly found that the taxpayer had received at the earlier
date an interest in the partnership, even if not fully vested. 89 This
finding enabled the court to hold that the taxpayer realized long-
term capital gain upon the sale of his interest after more than six
months."
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected the trial
court's ruling on the grounds that it allowed the taxpayer to pay tax
at capital gains rates on his share of the sale proceeds9' and that it
was based upon the self-serving concession that receipt of the inter-
est had constituted income, taxation of.which was barred by the
statute of limitations. 2 Reversing the lower court's decision, the
court of appeals found that the taxpayer had received neither in-
87. 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9407, at 84,005-06.
88. 73-1 U.S. Tax Cas. f 9260, at 80,506-07. As the court of appeals noted, however, the
tax owed under the trial court's holding, that income was reportable when the contracts
initially were executed, would have been uncollectable because of the running of the statute
of limitations. 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9407, at 84,008.
89. 73-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9260, at 80,507-09.
90. Id. at 80,509.
91. Not only was the income treated as capital gains income, but the taxpayer also was
allowed to deduct from the proceeds of the sale his basis in the interest supposedly transferred
to him initially, although he had paid no taxes on the receipt of that interest. 74-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. 9407, at 84,005.
92. Id. at 84,008. The court of appeals indicated its contempt for the taxpayer's claim: "In
this respect, taxpayer cannot at the same time 'have his cake and eat it too.'" Id.
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come nor any outright partnership interest upon the execution of the
original contracts 3 and that the payment from each investor repre-
sented compensation for services rendered which was taxable as
ordinary income upon receipt." Significantly, the court rejected the
trial court's finding that the fair market value of the interest con-
veyed to the taxpayer had been established, 5 finding that the value
was too conjectural and dependent upon "speculative factors."9
The court apparently deemed that section 721 and the regulations
thereunder had no bearing on the issue before it, although it found
support for its conclusion in Frazell9 7 Although neither of the
Diamond opinions was considered, the court of appeals later, when
denying a petition for rehearing, explicitly stated that Diamond was
inapposite and not inconsistent with the original decision in
Vestal." Indeed, Vestal and Diamond involved different types of
partnership interests: Diamond was concerned with an absolute
transfer of an interest in future profits, while Vestal involved a
contract to convey a complete partnership interest in the future
similar to the interest granted in Frazell.9
Nonetheless, a comparison of the facts in Diamond and Vestal
will illustrate some of the difficulties inherent in the Diamond ap-
proach. Two different business ventures were attempted in these
cases. The purchase of an existing office building in Diamond repre-
sented a rather stable investment facilitating valuation of a mem-
ber's interest. Conversely, the fact that the oil and gas undertaking
in Vestal was more speculative strongly influenced the court of ap-
peals to reject the trial court's finding that the taxpayer's interest
had a determinable market value long before operations had com-
menced. In light of this fundamental difference the two cases are
reconcilable, since under the "readily determinable market value"
test utilized in Diamond, the speculative nature of even an interest
in the future profits of, rather than a conditional promise of a future
capital interest in, the unproven fields would prevent immediate
taxation of the service partner.
93. Id. at 84,009.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 84,008. See 73-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9260, at 80,507.
96. 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9407, at 84,008.
97. Id. at 84,007.
98. Vestal v. United States, 74-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9501 (8th Cir. 1974).




The weakness of the test advanced in Diamond, however, is the
necessity of ascertaining when the transferred profit share is suscep-
tible to valuation. Although the facts presented in neither Diamond
nor Vestal seem troubling under this test,' other transferred inter-
ests might fall somewhere in between these extremes, making value
determinations much more difficult. Moreover, the fact that the
determination must be made at the inception of the venture com-
pounds its difficulty. If a service partner concludes that the market
value of the interest is readily determinable, reports it as current
ordinary income, and later decides to sell the interest after it has
appreciated in value, he assumes the risk that capital gains treat-
ment of the sale will be denied because of a finding that the value
in fact was not readily ascertainable upon receipt. In such a case,
the Commissioner might repeat the claim successfully made in
Vestal that the original income was reported erroneously and that
the entire proceeds of the later sale constitute ordinary income re-
ceived as compensation for services rendered.101 Conversely, if the
100. The court in Diamond also was blessed with a ready-made valuation because the
interest had been sold within a short time after it was created. Thus, the court not only was
dealing with a real estate project, arguably one of the more stable types of business ventures,
but it also was aided by the availability of perhaps the most accurate method of valuation, a
timely sale of the property in question between a willing seller and buyer. In contrast, the
valuation accepted by the trial court in Vestal was based upon testimony of one of the
partners in the venture given several years after the fact when the taxpayer was attempting
to restructure the transaction to minimize his tax liability. An example of the difficulties of
valuation when the interest is in a speculative business can be seen in Mailloux v. Commis-
sioner, 320 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1963) (Tax Court determination of fair market value reversed
where it had not given proper consideration to impairment of the value of uranium mining
corporation stock resulting from restrictions on resale and the highly speculative nature of
the stock).
101. One commentator has noted that the Diamond rule at least will enable service part-
ners to be taxed immediately on a profits-only interest with little value, while being able to
sell the interest later in a capital gains transaction. See Cowan, supra note 3, at 212. This
observation was made, however, after the Tax Court's absolute holding which no longer seems
correct in light of the court of appeals' narrower "readily determinable market value" test.
Because the tax treatment depends upon susceptibility of the profit share to valuation in each
case, such tax planning would be practical only in the most clear-cut cases. Indeed, the
suggestion that even in Diamond the taxpayer could have avoided recognition of extensive
ordinary income by having the profit share transferred to him at an early date when it had
little value would seem precluded by the rule in Diamond. If, in fact, the interest when
transferred has a negligible market value, but is transferred in anticipation that its value will
appreciate in later years, it would not have a readily determinable market value; the early
transfer itself would indicate that value of the profit share is not readily determinable and is
being transferred early to prevent greater taxation on the anticipated future value.
If the taxpayer were to establish a value for his interest and report that value as income,
the Service possibly would be estopped from later attempts to restructure the transaction as
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service partner determines that the market value is not readily de-
terminable, he will not report income upon receipt. Such action,
however, would leave his tax liability subject to a possible subse-
quent determination that his interest was susceptible to valuation
and that he had failed to report income that was realized in the year
of transfer. 2
one in which the profit share did not have a readily determinable market value. If several
years had passed since the initial return and if, as in Vestal, the statute of limitations had
run on the first return, this estoppel argument might be even stronger. Perhaps the taxpayer's
reliance also would be sufficient to support a laches defense to later restructuring by the
Service. Indeed, to deny the estoppel defense in such a situation would be to allow the Service
to effectuate the same type of after-the-fact restructuring that the court of appeals found so
distasteful in Vestal when attempted by the taxpayer. See notes 91-92 supra & accompanying
text. But if, for example, the initial receipt and subsequent sale were in the same tax year,
the IRS would seem free to rearrange the tax treatment of a profit-share transfer irrespective
of the taxpayer's expectations. Moreover, if the reviewing court was as unsympathetic to the
taxpayer's dilemma as were the Diamond courts, there is little hope that any reliance by the
taxpayer would be sufficient to overcome the deference to the Commissioner's expertise.
102. In addition to the uncertainty of valuation, which itself miglt be sufficient to discour-
age the use of profit shares as a means of service partner compensation, there is also the
problem of the absence of an established method of amortization by which the taxpayer, if
presently taxed on the "readily determined" market value of his profit share, can offset future
income derived from the profit share. See notes 67-69 supra & accompanying text. Without
some amortization, double taxation will result. This problem, like the uncertainty of business
planning resulting from the Diamond rule, was recognized by the court of appeals in
Diamond, but was not deemed a sufficient reason to reject the Commissioner's and Tax
Court's determinations. See 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9306, at 83,654. This problem is significant
not only because it presents increased difficulties in the use of profit shares, but also because
it compounds the unrealistic effects of a premature determination of the market value of a
profit share.
The taxpayer, if taxed on the value of the profit share when received, should be allowed to
deduct that amount from later income derived from the partnership profits interest over a
period of years. As with other methods of amortization and depreciation, however, the period
of years for which deductions are to be allowed might be determined in a rather arbitrary
manner. Unlike standard depreciation, the profit-share amortization would not rely on a basis
that had been determined in a market transaction; rather, it would be the product of a
subjective determination, presumably established by expert opinion or other less reliable
methods. If the interest were sold before the allowable amortization period expired, it is not
clear whether further deductions would be precluded. If the income received from the profit
share eventually was greater than the undiscounted value originally anticipated, it also would
be difficult to tax the unanticipated income.
These problems, of course, are not incapable of resolution, but adequate handling of the
related issues conceivably would require provisions as intricate as those dealing with depre-
ciation of income-producing property. This complexity indicates that the Diamond rule is
indeed arbitrary, based on the same conjecture, albeit much more limited, that was so
disliked by the court in Vestal. See also Partnership Interest, supra note 20, at 1535. Even
the court of appeals in Diamond recognized the desirability of precise regulation in this
nebulous area. See 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9306, at 83,654.
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When considering the facts presented in Diamond, both courts
deemed the ascertainable-value approach to be the necessary means
by which to reach a result they deemed appropriate. Several alter-
native approaches existed, however, by which those courts could
have held that the sale of the taxpayer's interest gave rise to realized
ordinary income instead of capital gains."0 3 One well-established
theory, the taxation of present income as ordinary income because
it represents an assignment of future ordinary income, could have
been employed without disturbing preexisting interpretations of the
regulations.
In Herman M. Hale,' cited by the court of appeals in Diamond
as authority for the pre-Diamond interpretation of the regulations,0 5
the Tax Court held that the sale of a partnership profit share gener-
ated ordinary income rather than capital gains for the seller.' The
taxpayer in Hale had received a future interest in partnership prof-
its as compensation for services yet to be rendered to a partnership
organized to develop a tract of land and sell homes constructed
thereon.10 Before the partnership earned profits, the taxpayer
elected to sell his profit share and report the net proceeds as capital
gains income. Despite the lack of profits prior to sale, the Tax Court
found that, at the sale date, future profits reasonably could be
estimated.0 ' Relying on cases that had denied capital gains treat-
103. For example, the court might have held that the taxpayer was an employee rather
than a partner, thus avoiding any question of acquisition of a partnership interest. See 74-1
U.S. Tax Cas. 3 506, at 83,651; Cowan, supra note 3, at 202-07. It also might have been
claimed that the taxpayer was granted an undervalued interest in profits that derived its true
value from the already appreciated value of partnership property, thus in effect constituting
a transfer of capital taxable under section 1.721-1(b)(1) of the treasury regulations. See 74-1
U.S. Tax Cas. 9306, at 83,654; Cowan, supra note 3, at 192. Conceivably, the transfer of a
profit share might be covered by section 83, although this section could not have been applied
to the pre-1969 transfers involved in Diamond. Proposed amendments to the regulations
under section 721 imply, however, that section 83 applies only to capital interests and not to
profit shares. See note 35 supra. See also Cowan, supra note 3, at 186-87.
Although these alternatives may have been proper, their applicability in Diamond was
aided by the precise facts of that case. Arguably, the alternatives would not apply to a broad
range of profit-share situations. Cf. notes 104-17 infra & accompanying text.
104. P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 65,274 (1965).
105. 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9306, at 83,653.
106. P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 65,274, at 65-1646.
107. Possibly, because the partnership in Hale was to terminate after all the planned
houses were sold, while in Diamond the anticipated real estate venture was to be an ongoing
concern, the two cases are distinguishable. Any such distinction, however, seems inconse-
quential when considering the taxation of a service partner in a bona fide joint venture that
is not a mere attempt to shield compensation income as a proprietary interest.
108. P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 65,274, at 65-1646. This finding indicates that the court, if asked
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:1009
ment upon the sale of a capital asset if the sale was in effect an
anticipation of future income, ' the court found that the sale of a
partnership profit share was not entitled to preferred tax treatment
despite the characterization of the share as a capital asset."' Ordi-
nary income was deemed to have been received on the sale because
the lump sum consideration constituted the present value of the
assignment of future income that the taxpayer would have received
but for the sale. 1'
Underlying the Hale decision was the policy of restricting the
availability of preferential tax treatment pursuant to the Code's
capital gains provisions.112 Although generally unarticulated, 13 this
same desire undeniably has induced the courts to formulate various
reasons for rejecting attempts by service partner-taxpayers to ma-
nipulate the wording of section 721 to their tax advantage. A frank
expression of this rationale would have alleviated the uncertainties
of the Diamond approach. The court of appeals could have achieved
the same tax result in Diamond merely by characterizing the sale
of the taxpayer's profit share as an assignment of income that he
otherwise would realize in the future. Moreover, this rationale would
to do so, might have found that the profit share had a readily determinable market value
when first conveyed, thus necessitating immediate taxation under the test later developed in
Diamond. The court in Hale, however, stated specifically that no income was realized on the
receipt of a profit share. Id. at 65-1646 n.3, cited in Diamoid v. Commissioner, 74-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. 9306, at 83,653 (7th Cir. 1974).
109. Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, 356 U.S. 260 (1958); Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28
(1941). "The lump sum consideration seems essentially a substitute for what would otherwise
be received at a future time as ordinary income." 356 U.S. at 265.
110. P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1 65,274, at 65-1646.
111. Id.
112. The Tax Court noted in Sol Diamond:
Even if one of petitioners'. . . arguments had prevailed, it would still not be
altogether clear that the $40,000 petitioner received on the sale of his interest
in the land trust would qualify as a short-term capital gain. Although section
741 [INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 741], provides for capital gain treatment on the
sale of an interest in a partnership, it is not at all clear that it contemplates the
sale of a right to receive income in the future in return for a lump sum payment
which would enable a taxpayer to convert what would otherwise be taxable as
ordinary income into capital gain . . . . In view of our disposition of this case,
however, we need not reach this question.
P-H Tax Ct. Rep. 1 56.42, at 56-379 n.16.
113. Apparently, only the court of appeals in Vestal has relied explicitly upon this principle
in service partner cases, noting that "'[c]apital gains treatment was intended [only] to
relieve the taxpayer from the excessive tax burden on gain resulting from a conversion to
capital investment.'" 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 119407, at 84,008, quoting Pounds v. United States,
372 F.2d 342, 346 (5th Cir. 1967).
1030
SERVICE PARTNER COMPENSATION
seem more proper in Diamond than in Hale, where the court faced
a claim that the profit-share interest was a capital asset."4 The
profit share in Hale had been held for a considerable period of time
and appeared to have been acquired for investment purposes,115
while in Diamond the relatively short holding period might raise an
inference that no investment purpose had motivated its transfer to
the taxpayer.1 If the Hale rationale had been used in Diamond,
there would have been no reason to create the unmanageable "read-
ily determinable market value" test; prior interpretations of section
721 could have continued unimpaired, and no income would have
been realized immediately upon the transfer of the profit share to
the service partner. Under a Hale approach, income later realized
by the profit-share recipient from his distributive portion of partner-
ship profits would be taxed as ordinary income. If, however, the
service partner later assigned or sold the profit share, the proceeds
from the assignment or sale also would be treated as ordinary in-
come since they would represent the realization of the present value
of anticipated future ordinary income. Utilization of this approach
would make unnecessary a speculative determination by the tax-
payer of the market value of his profit share and would alleviate the
need to develop a workable amortization or setoff procedure that
could prevent double taxation on the service partner's profit share.
CONCLUSION
Granting service partners a partnership interest is a desirable
compensation technique because it gives added incentive to pro-
mote the venture, to increase its profitability, and to enhance the
value of partnership assets. Such interests also provide a flexible
method of compensation by which the service partner's tax burden
may be minimized if properly planned. The receipt of a capital
interest by the service partner perhaps provides the most flexibility.
An outright grant, at a time when the interest has little value, can
minimize taxation by generating ordinary income only to the extent
of that small present value and by deferring taxation on the appre-
ciated value of the interest until it is sold, at which time it will
114. P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 65,274, at 65-1646. See INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 741 (capital
gains treatment provided for the sale of an interest in a partnership).
115. This fact alone would not justify treatment of the sale of the interest as a capital gains
transaction, however, since the interest had been received as compensation for services.
116. See Cowan, supra note 3, at 195.
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create capital gains. If restrictions on the enjoyment of a capital
interest are necessary for nontax reasons, similar planning also can
provide desirable tax treatment for the lower present value at the
transfer date.
Tax deferral benefits also can be achieved by granting the service
partner an interest in future profits. Although long believed to cre-
ate no present tax liability, profit shares recently have been held
taxable upon receipt if they have a readily determinable market
value. The present taxation of a profit share may benefit the service
partner in some circumstances since the taxation upon receipt as
ordinary compensation income would permit later capital gains
treatment of the sale of an interest that had appreciated in value."'
Use of this compensation device, however, undoubtedly will be cur-
tailed because it imposes upon the. service partner serious conse-
quences for any mistake in determining whether his share has a
readily determinable value and because it raises the specter of dou-
ble taxation.
117. See id. at 201.
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